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Abstract— Organizations face the issue of how to best allocate 
their security resources. Thus, they need an accurate method for 
assessing how many new vulnerabilities will be reported for the 
operating systems (OSs) they use in a given time period. Our 
approach consists of clustering vulnerabilities by leveraging the 
text information within vulnerability records, and then simulating 
the mean value function of vulnerabilities by relaxing the 
monotonic intensity function assumption, which is prevalent 
among the studies that use software reliability models (SRMs) and 
nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) in modeling. We 
applied our approach to the vulnerabilities of four OSs: Windows, 
Mac, IOS, and Linux. For the OSs analyzed in terms of curve 
fitting and prediction capability, our results, compared to a 
power-law model without clustering issued from a family of SRMs, 
are more accurate in all cases we analyzed. 
Keywords— Vulnerability assessment, Nonhomogeneous 
Poisson process, Clustering, Software reliability models 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Security decision makers often use public data sources1 to 
help make better decisions on, for example, what security 
products to choose, check for security trends, and estimate when 
new vulnerabilities that affect their installations will be 
publically reported. Several studies have applied software 
reliability models (SRMs) to estimate times between public 
reports of vulnerabilities [1]–[6]. The studies we are aware of 
estimate all vulnerabilities together. We postulate that such 
analysis may miss some trends that apply to separate categories 
of vulnerabilities, rather than all vulnerabilities together. 
Moreover, SRMs assume vulnerability detection to be an 
independent process. However, this process might not be 
independent due, for example, to the discovery of a new type of 
vulnerability that might prompt attackers to look for similar 
vulnerabilities [7]. This assumption may lead to sub-optimal 
predictions on the next reporting date of vulnerability, or the 
total number of new vulnerabilities reported in the next time 
interval. One way to mitigate these issues is to split 
vulnerabilities into separate clusters and ensure that the clusters 
are independent. 
                                                           
1 https://nvd.nist.gov/, https://exploit-db.com/ http://www.cvedetails.com/  
In this paper we present an approach that does the following: 
- uses existing clustering techniques to group 
vulnerabilities into distinct clusters, using the textual 
information reported in these vulnerabilities as a basis for 
constructing the clusters;  
- uses existing SRMs to make predictions on the number 
of new vulnerabilities that will be discovered in a given time 
period in the future for each of those clusters for a given OS; 
- superposes the SRMs used for each cluster together 
into a single model for predicting the number of new 
vulnerabilities that will be discovered in a given time period for 
a given OS.   
We have applied our approach on vulnerabilities of four 
different OSs: Windows (Microsoft), Mac (Apple), IOS (Cisco) 
and Linux. For these OSs, our approach when compared to a 
power-law model without clustering issued from a family of 
SRMs, gives more accurate curve fittings and predictions in all 
cases we analyzed. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
presents the related work. Section III details the dataset and how 
we processed the data. Section IV details the analysis. Section V 
presents the obtained results. Section VI discusses the results 
and lists the limitations. Finally, Section VII concludes the 
paper. 
II. RELATED WORK  
Vulnerabilities are software faults which are exploited as a 
result of security attacks. Thus, vulnerability discovery models 
(VDMs) and Software Reliability Models (SRMs) can be 
considered similar based on the fault detection processes. The 
intensity function can also represent the detection rate of 
vulnerabilities [8]. Research has been conducted to create a link 
between the fault discovery process and the vulnerability 
discovery process for modeling purposes [9]. Several studies 
have proposed new SRMs/ VDMs or applied existing models to 
estimate software security indicators such as total number of 
residual vulnerabilities in the system, time to next vulnerability 
(TTNV), vulnerability detection rate, etc. [1]–[4], [7]–[13].  
Rescorla [2], [3] proposed a VDM to find the number of 
undiscovered vulnerabilities for some OSs. In [4]–[6], Alhazmi 
and Malaiya proposed some regression models to simulate the 
vulnerability disclosure rate and predict the number of 
vulnerabilities that may potentially be present but may not yet 
have been found. Some studies have tried to increase the 
accuracy of vulnerability modeling. Joh et al. [14] proposed a 
new approach for modeling the skewness in vulnerability 
datasets by modifying common S-shaped models like Weibull 
and Gamma. However, all these models assume that the 
software under study has a finite number of vulnerabilities to be 
discovered [8]. While, in reality, releasing new patches might be 
accompanied by introducing new vulnerabilities to the product 
and dynamically change the number of vulnerabilities for a 
product.  All these models provide better curve fitting results 
than predictions. This is because a model may provide an 
excellent fit for the available data points, but if the future 
detection trends are not consistent with the model, the model 
doesn’t predict well [14].  
In addition to the vulnerabilities publication dates, software 
source code has been used for vulnerability assessment in the 
context of VDMs. Kim et al. [15] introduced a VDM based on 
shared source code measurements among multi-version 
software systems. In [16], Ozment and Schechter employed a 
reliability growth model to analyze the security of the OpenBSD 
OS by examining its source code and the rate at which new code 
has been introduced. Source code also proved not to be an 
adequately efficient measure in terms of prediction [7].  
Clustering is a method of structuring data according to 
similarities and dissimilarities into natural groupings [17]. 
Clustering for vulnerabilities can be used for splitting real-world 
exploited vulnerabilities from those which were exploited 
during software test (Proof-of-Concept Exploits) [18], detecting 
exploited vulnerabilities versus non-exploited ones when there 
is not enough information about some vulnerabilities in database 
[19]. Lee et al. [20] investigated a distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attack detection method using cluster analysis. Shahzad 
et al. [21] conducted a descriptive statistical analysis of a large 
software vulnerability dataset employing clustering on type-
based vulnerability data. Huang et al. [22] classified NVD 
vulnerabilities employing several clustering algorithms to create 
a relatively objective classification criterion among the 
vulnerabilities.  
III. DATASET AND DATA PROCESSING 
The data used in this paper has been collected from the 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) maintained by NIST. 
We developed Python scripts to scrape the publicly available 
data on vulnerabilities from NVD. We then stored the data in 
our own database, and identified each vulnerability by its 
Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) identifier. We used 
the CVE ID to compare the reporting date of each vulnerability 
in NVD, with the dates in other public repositories on 
vulnerabilities 2 . We then update the reporting date on our 
database to the earliest date that a given vulnerability was known 
                                                           
2 We looked at the following ones: http://www.cvedetails.com/, 
https://cxsecurity.com/, http://www.security-database.com/ and 
http://www.securityfocus.com/  
in any of these databases.  
For the rest of the paper, we will focus on the vulnerabilities 
reported for four well-known OSs: Windows (1995-2016), Mac 
(1997-2016), IOS (the OS associated with Cisco) (1992-2016), 
and Linux (1994-2016). We chose these OSs as they are most 
widely used, and had the most vulnerabilities in the databases. 
For each OS, we included all the vulnerabilities reported for any 
of its versions.  For instance, all the vulnerabilities reported for 
mac_os, mac_os_server, mac_os_x, and mac_os_x_server were 
put together to create a vulnerability database for Mac. We did 
this to have enough data for each OS. The total number of 
vulnerabilities in NVD for these OSs is 4238. We used text 
information within vulnerabilities reports to then label the 
vulnerabilities. The keywords for labelling (e.g., denial, 
injection, buffer, execute) were extracted from these reports. 
Table I shows the total number of vulnerabilities as well as the 
number of labelled and non-labelled (vulnerabilities without any 
associated text information in the database) vulnerabilities for 
these OSs. For the labelled vulnerabilities, we indicate the 
number and proportion of vulnerabilities associated with a 
specific keyword. Note that vulnerabilities can be labelled with 
more than one keyword.  Details for each OS are in Table II. 
TABLE I.  NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER OS 
OS Windows Mac IOS Linux 
# Vulnerabilities 1015 1129 389 1705 
# Labelled 
Vulnerabilities 
888 
(87.5%) 
920 
(81.5%) 
360 
(92.5%) 
1439 
(84.5%) 
# Non-labelled 
Vulnerabilities 
127 
(12.5%) 
209 
(18.5%) 
29 
(7.5%) 
266 
(15.5%) 
TABLE II.  NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE AND OS 
Keywords Windows Mac IOS Linux 
Denial of Service 242 (27.25%) 
412 
(44.8%) 
297 
(82.5%) 
860 
(59.8%)  
Execute Code 290 (32.7%) 
458 
(49.8%) 
24 
(6.7%) 
161 
(11.2%) 
Overflow 174 (19.6%) 
338 
(36.7%) 
29 
(8.1%) 
298 
(20.7%) 
SQL Injection 0 0 0 4   (0.3%) 
Obtain 
Information 
49    
(5.5%) 
113 
(12.3%) 
9 
(2.5%) 
229 
(15.9%) 
Gain Privileges 325 (36.6%) 
116 
(12.6%) 
4 
(1.1%) 
205 
(14.25%) 
Bypass 
Restriction or 
Similar 
62    
(7.0%) 
115 
(12.5%) 
38 
(10.6%) 
112 
(7.8%) 
Directory 
Traversal 
2     
(0.2%) 
12 
(1.3%) 
4 
(1.1%) 
8   
(0.6%) 
Cross Site 
Scripting 
10    
(1.1%) 
15 
(1.6%) 
2 
(0.6%) 
11 
(0.8%) 
Http Response 
Splitting 0 
2   
(0.2%) 0 
1 
(0.07%) 
CSRF 0 2   (0.2%) 
1 
(0.3%) 0 
Memory 
Corruption 
59    
(6.6%) 
145 
(15.8%) 
5 
(1.4%) 
70 
(4.9%) 
  
For cluster analysis, we need to ensure that the features 
(keywords) are not correlated. Therefore, we checked the 
Pearson correlation coefficient for every two keywords per OS. 
When we found statistically significant correlation, we merged 
the correlated keywords with a title which included both terms. 
For instance, due to the high correlation of .99 (p-value<0.001, 
ܪ଴: ߩ = 0) between “Execute” and “Code” for all Oss, these 
terms were treated as “Execute Code”. The same applied for the 
keywords “SQL” and “Injection”. No other significant 
correlation was observed. 
For clustering, we used the HPCLUS (High Performance 
Clustering) procedure in SAS 9.4 with the k-means and k-modes 
algorithms for clustering nominal input variables. This 
procedure uses the least square method in k-means to compute 
cluster centroids. Each iteration reduces the criterion (e.g., the 
least squared criterion for Euclidean distance) until convergence 
is achieved or the maximum iteration number is reached [23]. 
Additionally, we set our method to cluster the data based upon 
the associated principal component analysis (PCA) scores 
derived from the linear combinations of binary attributes for 
each OS. PCA reduces the number of features that might be 
correlated to independent linear combinations of them [17].   
To estimate the best number of clusters the aligned box 
criterion (ABC) method was used. The cubic clustering criterion 
(CCC) is another common metric which is usually used in 
clustering applications to find the most suitable number of 
clusters [24]. Tibshirani et al. [25] proposed a gap statistics 
method which leverages Monte Carlo simulation for detecting 
the best number of clusters in a database. However, the ABC 
method improves the CCC and gap statistics methods by 
leveraging a high-performance machine-learning based analysis 
structure [23]. In addition, within-cluster dispersion was also 
used as an error measure (also called a ‘Gap’) by the ABC 
method [25]. In order to find the best number of clusters, we 
applied the ABC method that compares the calculated Gap 
values over a range of possible k values. The best number of 
clusters occurs at the maximum peak value in Gap (k) [23]. We 
obtained 6, 6, 7, 7 clusters for Windows, Mac, IOS, and Linux, 
respectively. 
Tables III - VI lists the keywords associated with each of the 
six / seven clusters for Windows, Mac, IOS, and Linux 
respectively. 
The most frequent keywords were selected to name the 
clusters with respect to the keywords’ weights information 
provided in Tables III - VI. We assumed that the keywords 
which covered at least 60% of vulnerabilities in each cluster can 
be good representatives of relative clusters.  
Since, none of the keywords reach the weight threshold of 
0.6 in the third cluster associated with Mac, the keyword with 
greatest weight (Denial of Service) was selected as the cluster’s 
label. All the OSs have one cluster with a similar name. There 
are also similarly named clusters within some OSs. However, 
analyzing their linear correlation, we did not find any significant 
relationship based on the Pearson correlation test. Table VII 
shows the cluster summaries for the OSs. 
 
TABLE III.  NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER 
(WINDOWS) 
Keywords 
Windows 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Denial of Service 16   (0.2%) 
22    
(0.9%) 
6     
(0.3%) 
188 
(0.7%) 
5    
(0.02%)
5     
(0.03%)
Execute Code 98   (0.95%)
5      
(0.2%) 
15    
(0.9%) 0 0  
171     
(1.0%) 
Overflow 103    (1.0%) 
21    
(0.9%) 0 
17   
(0.06%)
33    
(0.1%) 0  
SQL Injection 0 0 0 0 0  0  
Obtain 
Information 
1     
(0.01%) 0 
1     
(0.06%) 
43   
(0.2%) 
4    
(0.01%) 0  
Gain Privileges 2     (0.02%)
14    
(0.6%) 0 0 
300 
(1.0%)
9     
(0.05%)
Bypass 
Restriction or 
Similar 
0 0 0 56   (0.2%) 
5    
(0.02%)
1     
(0.01%)
Directory 
Traversal 0 0 0 
1       
(0%) 
1     
(0%) 0  
Cross Site 
Scripting 0 0 0 
8     
(0.03%) 0  
2     
(0.01%)
Http Response 
Splitting 0 0 0 0 0  0  
CSRF 0 0 0 0 0  0  
Memory 
Corruption 
9     
(0.09%)
23    
(1.0%) 
18      
(1.0%) 0 
9    
(0.03%) 0  
# Vulnerabilities 103 24 18 272 300 171 
TABLE IV.  NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (MAC) 
Keywords 
Mac 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Denial of Service 174 (0.6%) 0 
120 
(0.4%) 0 0 
118 
(1.0%)
Execute Code 253 (0.9%) 0 0 
3 
(0.03%)
90 
(0.97) 
112 
(0.95%)
Overflow 101 (0.3%) 0 
23 
(0.07%) 
3 
(0.03%)
93 
(1.00) 
118 
(1.0%)
SQL Injection 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Obtain 
Information 
1 
(0%) 
1 
(0.07%) 
103 
(0.3%) 
8 
(0.07%) 0 0 
Gain Privileges 12 (0.04%) 0 
99 
(0.3%) 
4 
(0.03%) 0 
1 
(0.01%)
Bypass 
Restriction or 
Similar 
0 0 0 115 (1.0%) 0 0 
Directory 
Traversal 
3 
(0.01%) 0 
8 
(0.03%) 
1 
(0.01%) 0 0 
Cross Site 
Scripting 0 
15 
(1.0%) 0 0 0 0 
Http Response 
Splitting 0 
2 
(0.1%) 0 0 0 0 
CSRF 0 0 1 (0.03%) 
1 
(0.01%) 0 0 
Memory 
Corruption 
139 
(0.5%) 0 
5 
(0.02%) 
1 
(0.01%) 0 0 
# Vulnerabilities 271 15 308 115 93 118 
 
 
 
 TABLE V.  NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (IOS) 
Keywords 
IOS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Denial of Service 0 8      (1.0%) 
19 
(0.8%) 
3      
(1.0%) 
4    
(0.3%) 0 
262   
(1.0%)
Execute Code 3  (0.07%) 0 
8   
(0.3%) 0 
13     
(1.0%) 0 0 
Overflow 1  (0.02%)
2  
(0.25%)
26     
(1.0%) 0 0 0 0 
SQL Injection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Obtain 
Information 
6   
(0.1%) 
3   
(0.4%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Gain Privileges 1  (0.02%) 0 0 0 
3  
(0.2%) 0 0 
Bypass 
Restriction or 
Similar 
35  
(0.8%) 0 0 
3      
(1.0%) 0 0 0 
Directory 
Traversal 0 0 0 0 0 
4      
(1.0%) 0 
Cross Site 
Scripting 
2  
(0.05%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Http Response 
Splitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSRF 0 0 0 0 1  (0.08%) 0 0 
Memory 
Corruption 0 
5   
(0.6%) 0 0 0 0 0 
# Vulnerabilities 44 8 26 3 13 4 262 
TABLE VI.  NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (LINUX) 
Keywords 
Linux 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Denial of Service 136 (0.5%) 
53     
(1.0%) 
70     
(1.0%)
600    
(1.0%) 
1   
(0.01%) 0 0 
Execute Code 126 (0.5%) 0 
7     
(0.1%)
17 
(0.03%)
8    
(0.07%)
2   
(0.01%)
1      
(0%) 
Overflow 208 (0.8%) 
15 
(0.3%) 
36 
(0.5%) 0 0 
31 
(0.2%)
8  
(0.04%)
SQL Injection 2   (0.01%) 0 0 0 
2   
(0.02%) 0 0 
Obtain 
Information 
4   
(0.02%)
2   
(0.04%)
3   
(0.04%)
10 
(0.02%)
3   
(0.03%)
5   
(0.03%)
202   
(1.0%)
Gain Privileges 0 53     (1.0%) 
15 
(0.2%) 0 
3  
(0.03%)
134 
(0.9%) 0 
Bypass 
Restriction or 
Similar 
1      
(0%) 0 0 
5   
(0.01%)
106 
(0.95%) 0 0 
Directory 
Traversal 0 0 0 0 
7  
(0.06%)
1   
(0.01%) 0 
Cross Site 
Scripting 0 0 0 0 0 
11 
(0.08%) 0 
Http Response 
Splitting 0 0 0 0 0 
1   
(0.01%) 0 
CSRF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Memory 
Corruption 0 0 
70     
(1.0%) 0 0 0 0 
# Vulnerabilities 256 53 70 600 112 146 202 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VII.  CLUSTER COMPOSITION 
OS Cluster number Prevalent Keywords 
Cluster 
Name 
W
in
do
w
s 
1 Execute code, Overflow EO 
2 DoS , Overflow, Memory corruption DOM 
3 Execute code, Memory corruption EM 
4 DoS D 
5 Gain privileges G 
6 Execute code E 
M
ac
 
1 DoS, Execute code DE 
2 Cross site scripting C 
3 DoS D 
4 Bypass a restriction B 
5 Execute code, Overflow EO 
6 Dos, Execute code, Overflow DEO 
IO
S 
1 Bypass a restriction B 
2 DoS,  Memory corruption DM 
3 DoS , Overflow DO 
4 DoS, Bypass a restriction DB 
5 Execute code E 
6 Directory Traversal DT 
7 DoS D 
L
in
ux
 
1 DoS , Overflow DO 
2 Dos,  Gain privileges DG 
3 DoS, Memory corruption DM 
4 DoS D 
5 Bypass a restriction B 
6 Gain privileges G 
7  Obtain Information O 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is often used 
when modeling the mean cumulative number of failures (MCF) 
(ݐ) for repairable systems and for software reliability 
evaluations. The core assumption is that the number of detected 
failures follows a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. In the case 
of NHPP-based repairable systems, the intensity function 
λ(ݐ)=݀ܧ[߉(ݐ)]/݀ݐ is often assumed to be a monotonic function 
of t. Similarly, in NHPP-based software reliability models 
(SRMs), the intensity function (the detection rate of software 
errors) is considered to be a monotonic function [26].  
Let us expand the discussion for a software when there exists 
more than one type of error. When any type of error 
independently causes the software normal function to be 
compromised, then the superposition model represents the 
software failures. Let us assume that we are dealing with 
vulnerabilities classified into independent clusters. Let ߉௝(ݐ) 
denote the NHPP for the vulnerabilities from the ݆௧௛ cluster in 
(0 t], with intensity function ߣ௝(ݐ|ߙ௝, ߚ௝)  where the function 
form of ߣ௝(ݐ|ߙ௝, ߚ௝) is given and the values of the parameters ߙ௝, 
ߚ௝are unknown. It is assumed that the number of vulnerabilities 
from any ݆௧௛  cluster ߉௝(ݐ) , ݆ = 1,2, … ܬ  is independent. A 
process ߉(ݐ) = ∑ ߉௝(ݐ)௃௝ୀଵ , which counts the total number of 
vulnerabilities in the interval (0 t] for the superposition model, 
is also a non-homogeneous Poisson process with an intensity 
function ߣ(ݐ|ߙ, ߚ) = ߣଵ(ݐ|ߙଵ, ߚଵ) + ⋯+ ߣ௃(ݐ|ߙ௃, ߚ௃) , where 
ߙ = {ߙଵ, … , ߙ௃}  , ߚ = {  ߚଵ, … , ߚ௃} . Since the superposition 
model remains an NHPP (all intensity functions are NHPPs), the 
associated superposition model can be applicable [26]. The most 
prevalent types of intensity functions for NHPPs are power-law 
and log-linear (exponential) models. We used the power-law 
model since this model provided better curve fitting results 
compared to the log-linear model. In such case, the equations 
become: 
ߣ௝൫ݐหߙ௝, ߚ௝൯ =
ߙ௝
ߛ௝ ቆ
ݐ
ߛ௝ቇ
ఈೕିଵ
= ߙ௝ݐ
ఈೕିଵ
ߛ௝ఈೕ 			 
ߛ௝ = ቆ
1
ߚ௝ቇ
ଵ
ఈೕ 	,				ߙ௝ > 0, 			ߚ௝ > 0, 			ߛ௝ > 0 
In this paper, we expect to obtain better assessment results 
when relaxing the monotonicity assumption of the intensity 
function that is prevalent in SRMs and VDMs. We created 
independent clusters that can be modeled using separate NHPPs. 
Selecting a power-law intensity function, we considered two 
models for this paper. The first model is a NHPP-based SRM, 
which uses non-clustered data (including all the labeled and non-
labeled vulnerabilities). The second model is the superposition 
of the NHPPs fitted to the clustered data (only the labelled 
vulnerabilities can be used to create the clusters), which relaxes 
the monotonicity assumption of the intensity function. The 
purpose of both models is to fit and predict the total number of 
reported vulnerabilities (labeled and non-labeled) over the study 
period. 
The analysis was done in two steps. First, we used the time 
difference between vulnerability report dates to find the model 
parameters from the process of fitting NHPPs to the data 
(clustered and non-clustered). Non-homogeneity of the clusters 
were also validated in this step by looking at Laplace-trend test 
results provided by MiniTab 16 to see whether there were 
meaningful trends in clusters. Second, we used the estimated 
parameters and the models, and simulated corresponding MCFs 
(one MCF for clustered data, and one for non-clustered data) 
starting from ݐ଴=0 and time intervals of 10 days. 
V. RESULTS 
In this section we will provide the results regarding 
estimation (comparing the results between clustered data and 
non-clustered data) and forecasting (comparing the obtained 
predictions with clustered data and non-clustered data using a 
subset of the data). 
Figure 1 shows the observed vulnerability data, the MCF 
obtained without clustering the data and the superimposed MCF 
when clustering is applied for all the OSs in our study. For 
Windows, the MCF with clustering is more conservative during 
roughly the first 3000 days then the MCF without clustering 
becomes more conservative. The real data crosses the estimates 
between roughly 2000 and 3000 days. Besides this period, the 
MCF with and without clustering provide more conservative 
estimates. For IOS, the MCF with and without clustering as well 
as the real data are almost overlapping. For Mac and Linux, the 
MCF with clustering is above the MCF without clustering, 
providing a more conservative estimation. The real data is above 
the MCF without clustering and for a short period above the 
MCF with clustering. Thus for Mac and Linux, the MCF with 
clustering provide more conservative and accurate estimates.  
The analysis of forecasting is done for the final third of the 
time period from the beginning of the vulnerability discovery 
process. During the training period (first two thirds of the time 
period), all the available data are used to estimate model 
parameters. Figure 2 shows the forecast of the number of 
vulnerabilities based on the MCFs calculated with and without 
clustering compared to the observed vulnerabilities. For the 
vulnerabilities associated with Windows, the forecast with 
clustering leads to more conservative and more accurate 
estimates compared to non-clustering. In addition, the forecast 
without clustering remains below the observed vulnerability 
data (real data) for the prediction time period which started after 
day 5088. Both models lead to more conservative predictions for 
the vulnerabilities associated with Mac. However, the 
clustering-based MCF trajectory provides more accurate 
predictions. For IOS the forecast without clustering is more 
conservative compared to the forecast with clustering. When the 
MCF without clustering remains above the real data (which is 
good), it is not the case of the forecast with clustering where the 
real data crosses the forecast after Day 7500. For Linux, the 
predictions with clustering and the real observed data are close 
but the forecast remains above the real data and thus provides 
conservative estimation (which is good). The clustering-based 
MCF is, however, much more accurate than that of the non-
clustering MCF. 
We applied the Chi-square (χଶ) goodness of fit test [14] to 
see how well each model fits the datasets for both estimation and 
forecasting. The Chi-square statistic is calculated using the 
following equation:  
χଶ = ෍( ௜ܵ − ௜ܱ)
ଶ
௜ܱ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
Where ௜ܵ and ௜ܱ  are the simulated and real observed values at 
݅௧௛ time point, respectively. N is the number of observations (the 
time blocks used for simulation). For the fit to be acceptable, the 
corresponding χଶ  critical value should be greater than the χଶ 
statistic value for the given alpha level and degrees of freedom. 
We selected an alpha level of 0.05. The null hypothesis indicates 
that the actual distribution is well described by the fitted model. 
Hence, if the P-value of the χଶ test is below 0.05, then the fit will 
be considered to be unsatisfactory. A p-value closer to 1 
indicates a better fit. 
Rଶ  is another fitting statistic widely used in regression 
analysis [17]. Rଶ values close to 1 indicates a good fit. Rଶ values 
are often used in linear regression analysis [27]. We also 
considered an additional error indicator to compare the accuracy 
of the results derived from both models. 
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Fig. 1. Comparison of Clustered and Non-clustered MCFs with Vulnerability Data 
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Fig. 2. Comparison of Clustered and Non-clustered Forecasts with Vulnerability Data 
 
The normalized root mean square error (NRMSE) is often used. 
However, Mentaschi et al. [28] showed that for some 
applications (e.g., high fluctuation of real data) the higher values 
of NRMSE are not always a reliable indicator of the accuracy of 
simulations. To remedy the situation, a corrected estimator HH 
was proposed by Hanna and Heinold [29]: 
ܪܪ = 	ඨ∑ ( ௜ܵ − ௜ܱ)
ଶே௜ୀଵ
∑ ௜ܵ ௜ܱே௜ୀଵ
 
where ௜ܵ is the ݅௧௛ simulated data, ௜ܱ  is the ݅௧௛ observation and 
N is the number of observations (the time blocks used for 
simulation). The closer to zero HH is, the more accurate the 
model. 
Table VIII contains the Chi-square goodness of fit test for 
the clustering-based MCF and the MCF without clustering, the 
values of Rଶ, and HH for the vulnerabilities of the four OSs in 
our study.   
We considered the entire dataset for analyzing estimation 
accuracy. When considering the entire dataset, both estimations 
(with/without clustering) are statistically sound for all OSs but 
one (Mac, without clustering) with P-values greater than 0.05. 
The Chi-square test results indicate that both fits are reasonably 
good in most cases except the case associated with the non-
clustered based MCF on Mac data. The Rଶ statistics show that 
estimations based on clustering are more accurate than the ones 
without clustering. HH results also show that clustering based 
estimations came up with smaller errors compared with non-
clustering. For all OSs in our study the estimations based on 
clustering were more accurate in all cases. In addition, the MCF 
model without clustering was not statistically adequate to model 
the vulnerability data in one case (Mac). 
Table IX contains the Chi-square goodness of fit test for 
prediction values of the clustering and non-clustering-based 
MCF, the Rଶ and HH prediction values for the vulnerabilities of 
the four OSs in our study. We considered the common 66% 
splits between training and forecasting which means all the 
available data in the first two thirds of the study time period were 
used to estimate model parameters.   
For the vulnerabilities associated with Windows, Mac, and 
Linux, all considered training/forecasting results using non-
clustered data lead to statistically inadequate fits since all the 
relative P-values are zeros. For vulnerabilities associated with 
IOS, while both models came up with adequate fits based upon 
the Chi-squared test result, the clustering-based forecast is more 
accurate due to higher R-squared and lower HH values. For the 
other OSs, the predictions associated with clustered data are 
statistically sound with P-values greater than 0.05 and 
reasonably good R-squared and HH values. Thus, the forecasts 
based on clustering were more accurate in all cases. In addition, 
the MCF model without clustering was not statistically adequate 
to model the vulnerability data in three cases. 
 
 
 
TABLE VIII.  ESTIMATION ACCURACY FOR FOUR OSS 
Estimation 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value  R-sq HH p-value R-sq HH 
Windows 1 0.975 0.098 1 0.945 0.145 
Mac 0.052 0.851 0.242 0.028 0.837 0.326 
IOS 1 0.987 0.084 1 0.972 0.098 
Linux 1 0.995 0.06 1 0.992 0.099 
TABLE IX.  FORECASTING ACCURACY FOR FOUR OSS 
Forecasting 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value  R-sq HH p-value R-sq HH 
Windows 0.792 0.838 0.104 0 0.558 0.196 
Mac 0.115 0.577 0.238 0 -0.316 0.514 
IOS 0.992 0.902 0.122 0.977 0.896 0.135 
Linux 0.708 0.833 0.102 0 -1.822 0.367 
 
VI.  LIMITATIONS 
The main limitation of the work we present in the paper is 
with regard to using SRMs as VDMs. Software reliability 
models usually assume that the time between failures represents 
total usage time of that product. What we are using is calendar 
time, which may not be a good proxy for usage. Crucially the 
difference in security is the difficulty in estimating the “attacker 
effort” - the total amount of time that an attacker spends in 
finding a vulnerability - which is something that is not needed 
for reliability (we assume the users accidentally encounter faults 
that lead to failures, hence usage time is a good enough proxy 
for time between failures). A useful discussion of this is given 
in [30]. Note that this limitation is not only for our work, but 
applies to research that uses SRMs as VDM and utilizes 
vulnerability data. However, attacker effort is something that is 
very difficult to estimate and quantify. The purpose of our 
research is hence to make as good a use as possible of the 
publically available security data to help with decision making. 
But at the same time to be clear about the limitations on what we 
can conclude from this analysis. The best we can say from the 
analysis we present is “the total number of vulnerabilities that 
will be reported in the NVD over an interval t for product x is y 
with confidence z”. And we show that we can do this prediction 
better with clustering than without clustering for four of the 
largest and most commonly used operating system families. For 
some decision makers this may be a valuable piece of additional 
information, which they can use in conjunction with data they 
have from their own installations, when deciding on security 
operating system/product choices, and provisioning of security 
support services to deal with new vulnerabilities.   
We have only applied the approach to four well-known 
operating systems that had the largest number of vulnerabilities 
compared to others. We don’t know yet how well this works for 
other operating systems or other applications like web browsers, 
though we plan to extend this work in the future.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We presented an approach that: first, uses existing clustering 
techniques to group vulnerabilities into distinct clusters; second, 
uses an existing Non-Homogenous Poisson Process (NHPP) 
Software Reliability Model (SRM) to make predictions on the 
number of new vulnerabilities that will be discovered in a given 
time period for each of those clusters for a given OS; and finally, 
superimpose the SRMs used for each cluster together into a 
single model for predicting the number of new vulnerabilities 
that will be discovered in a given time period for a given OS. 
We provided results from applying our approach to 
vulnerabilities of four different OSs: Windows, Mac, IOS, and 
Linux, and comparisons of the predictive accuracy of our 
approach compared with an NHPP model (with monotonic 
intensity function) that does not use clustering. We found that 
our approach with clustering, compared with the same modeling 
mechanism without clustering: 
• Is statistically adequate in terms of model fitting and 
forecasting based upon the Chi-squared goodness of fit 
test results for all cases we analyzed, while the model 
without clustering was not statistically sound in 4 out of 
8 cases analyzed. 
• Gives more conservative forecasting results in all cases 
while the model without clustering was not conservative 
for Windows. 
• Gives more accurate results for all the cases analyzed 
compared to non-clustering. 
These results look encouraging, especially as they have been 
applied for some of the most widely used software products 
(operating systems) which tend to have the most number of 
vulnerabilities reported. In current and future work we will 
apply this approach to other widely used products such as web 
browsers and database systems.  
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